Innovation and imitation: effects of intellectual property rights in a product-cycle model of skills accumulation by Chen, Hung-Ju
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Innovation and imitation: effects of
intellectual property rights in a
product-cycle model of skills
accumulation
Hung-Ju Chen
National Taiwan University
April 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65745/
MPRA Paper No. 65745, posted 27. July 2015 08:42 UTC
 1
  
Innovation and Imitation:  
Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in a 
Product-cycle Model of Skills Accumulation 
 
Hung- Ju Chen* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South 
on innovation, imitation, the pattern of production and wage inequality based on a North-South 
product-cycle model with foreign direct investment (FDI) and skills accumulation. This 
quality-ladder model features innovative R&D in the North and imitative R&D in the South. Two 
types of innovation are considered: innovation targeting all products and innovation targeting only 
imitated products. We find that for both types of innovation, strengthening IPR protection reduces 
the innovation rate and raises the imitation rate. There is also an increase in the proportion of 
Northern unskilled labor and a decrease in Northern wage inequality. As for the pattern of 
production, the extent of FDI may decrease while the extent of Northern production may increase. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Given that it is now very common for international production to be achieved through foreign direct 
investment (FDI), firms can choose to produce goods domestically or abroad as a means of saving 
costs. However, due to inadequate protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) in many 
developing countries, firms need to take the risk of imitation into account when producing goods 
abroad. This phenomenon has made developed countries like the U.S. and some European countries 
put forth efforts at improving IPR protection in developing countries during the 1980s, leading to the 
approval of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) for the 
Uruguay Round.  
Supporters of strengthening IPR protection claim that not only developed countries, but also 
developing countries can benefit from such strengthening. For developed countries, stronger IPR 
protection mitigates imitation risk and encourages innovation, while at the same time reducing 
production cost. Developing countries can benefit from stronger IPR protection by attracting firms 
to shift their production bases to the developing countries. The increase in FDI flows also has the 
added advantage of bringing cutting-edge technologies to the developing countries. However, those 
who are against such strengthening doubt whether FDI activities or innovation intensity will increase 
with the strengthening of IPR protection. They further argue that the shift of production to the 
developing countries will reduce the demand for unskilled workers and enlarge the wage inequality 
in the developed countries.  
Most studies in the theoretical literature examining the effects of stronger IPR protection tend 
to assume that imitation is costless and model the strengthening of IPR protection as an exogenous 
reduction in imitation intensity. Based on a model where innovation involves the development of 
new varieties, Lai (1998) demonstrates that strengthening IPR protection in developing countries 
will raise both the innovation rate and FDI flows. However, Glass and Wu (2007) find that if 
innovation involves upgrading the quality of products, then the effects of such strengthening depend 
on the targets of imitation. If innovation targets all types of products, stronger IPR protection will raise 
both innovation intensity and FDI flows, but if innovation targets only imitated products, stronger IPR 
protection will cause reverse effects on the innovation rate and FDI flows. These studies indicate that 
the nature of the innovation process (innovation involving variety enlargement or quality improvement) 
and the targets of innovation are important determinants to the effects of IPR protection. 
Although assuming that imitation intensity is costless can simplify the analysis, empirical studies 
find that imitation is in fact a costly process. Levin et al. (1987) report that “patents raise imitation 
costs by about forty percentage points for both major and typical new drugs, but about thirty 
percentage points for major new chemical products, and by twenty-five percentage points for typical 
chemical products.” Therefore, introducing imitation costs into the economic analysis of IPR 
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protection endogenizes rivals’ imitation decisions and may generate different results. By modeling the 
strengthening of IPR protection as an increase in the cost of imitation, Glass and Saggi (2002) show 
that such strengthening is accompanied by a reduction in the innovation rate due to labor wastage and 
imitation tax effects.1 
Although the change in wage inequality in developed countries is one of the major concerns 
regarding the effects of IPR protection and FDI, very few theoretical studies focus on this concern 
due to the complexity of the model caused by the setting of the heterogeneous agents in the 
developed countries.2 An examination of the effects of outsourcing and IPR protection on wage 
inequality is found in Sayek and Sener (2006) and Benz (2012),3 but the fraction of skilled 
(unskilled) population is not endogenized and is assumed to be constant in both studies. As a result, 
their analyses focus on the demand-side effect as firms adjust labor demand in response to changes 
in outsourcing costs or Southern IPR protection and ignore the fact that these changes will also 
affect labor supplies of skilled and unskilled workers.4  
In this paper we revisit the issue of the effects of stronger IPR protection in developing 
countries. In particular, we consider a North-South general-equilibrium model with costly imitation 
and heterogeneous Northerners.5 This quality-ladder model features innovative R&D in the North (a 
developed country) and imitative R&D in the South (a developing country). Innovation improves the 
quality of goods and Northern innovative firms hire skilled Northern workers to engage in R&D 
activity. The skill choice of Northerners is endogenized - that is, Northerners can choose to become 
skilled workers and work in the R&D sector or remain unskilled and work in the production sector.  
Northern production firms could choose either to carry out the entire production of the goods 
in the North or allow the goods to be produced through FDI in the South. Multinational firms 
produce products in the South through the use of state-of-the-art technologies in order to take 
advantage of the lower Southern wage rate, but they face the risk of imitation by Southern firms. 
Southern firms can invest in imitation and strengthening IPR protection in the South will raise the 
                                                 
1  See Gallini (1992) and Pepall and Richards (1994) for studies that allow for non-trivial imitation. 
2  Recently, studies of Chu (2010) and Cozzi and Galli (2013) examine the effects of patent protection on 
income/wage inequality for a closed economy. Based on a quality-ladder model, Chu (2010) finds that 
strengthening patent protection will raise income inequality. Based on a structure of a two-stage cumulative 
innovation, Cozzi and Galli (2013) show that tightening patent protection in basic research has ambiguous 
effect on wage inequality. 
3  Lai (1995) and Chen (2013) also adopt the setting of heterogeneity of workers to examine the effects of the 
labor supply on the global distribution of income and the impact of IPR protection on FDI and outsourcing 
decisions. 
4  Based on a model with the existence of heterogeneous workers in both the developed and developing 
countries, the effect of the strengthening of IPR protection on innovation and FDI is also examined by Parello 
(2008). However, the results of his study do not provide any clear direction of the effects of the strengthening 
of IPR protection on either innovation or FDI due to the complexity of the model. 
5  The North-South product-cycle model is originally introduced by Vernon (1966) and subsequently 
developed by Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b). 
 4
cost of imitation. Once Southern firms succeed in imitation, they will be able to use the 
state-of-the-art technologies to produce the highest quality products. Traditionally, stronger IPR 
protection is modeled as an exogenous reduction in the imitation rate. However, with the 
endogeneity of imitation intensity, stronger IPR protection may increase or decrease the imitation 
rate. 
Two scenarios of innovation are considered herein. In the first scenario, Northern innovation 
targets all types of products. Stronger IPR protection in the South will lead to an increase in the 
incentives of Northern firms to shift production to the South, causing a reduction in the demand for 
Northern unskilled labor. However, the increases in FDI flows and the labor cost of imitation raise 
the demand for Southern labor, thereby restoring the rewards of Northern production. This will 
cause a decrease in the extent of FDI and an increase in the demand for Northern unskilled labor. 
We find that there will be an overall increase in the fraction of Northern unskilled labor and a 
decrease in Northern wage inequality, thereby reducing the innovation rate and raising the imitation 
rate. As for the pattern of production, the extent of Northern production will increase while the 
extent of FDI will decrease if strengthening IPR protection in the South reduces adjusted global 
expenditure. 
In the second scenario, only those products imitated by Southern firms will be targeted by 
Northern innovation.6 The stronger IPR protection affects Northern wage inequality through three 
channels. First, it raises the demand for Northern skilled labor due to an increase in the incentive of 
innovation, causing an increase in Northern wage inequality. Second, since innovation targets only 
imitated goods, the reduction in imitation risk means that there are fewer products imitated by 
Southern firms, and this will reduce the demand for Northern skilled labor, thereby decreasing 
Northern wage inequality. Third, the increase in the demand for Southern labor due to increases in 
the extent of FDI and the requirement of Southern labor for imitation will restore the rewards of 
Northern production, thereby generating increases in the extent of Northern production and the 
demand for Northern unskilled labor and a reduction in Northern wage inequality. We find that there 
will be an overall increase in the proportion of unskilled workers in the North, along with 
corresponding decreases in Northern wage inequality, the extent of FDI and the innovation rate. 
                                                 
6  Glass and Wu (2007) also adopt the same innovation setting, where innovators are separated into leaders and 
followers, with those firms developing the most recent quality improvement being the leaders. If followers are as 
efficient as leaders, then innovation will target all types of products. If followers are less efficient than leaders,  
then innovation will be undertaken only by leaders and leaders will not undertake further innovation until 
Southern firms have imitated their most recent innovation. Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) study to what extent 
should the IPR of innovators be protected based on a model where followers can copy the technology of the 
leader. With quantitative investigation of the implications of different types of IPR protection on the 
equilibrium growth rate and welfare, they find that full patent protection is not optimal. 
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Moreover, the strengthening of Southern IPR protection will raise the imitation rate, but its effect on 
the pattern of production is ambiguous. 
Stronger IPR protection in the South which raises the incentives for innovation and the motivation 
to shift production from the North to the South will cause different effects on the demand of skilled 
and unskilled labor in the North. Moreover, the endogeneity of imitation risk allows for the 
re-allocation of Southern labor between the production sector and imitation sector in response to the 
strengthening of IPR protection. Therefore, when considering the effects of the strengthening of IPR 
protection, the character of Northern labor (homogeneous v.s. heterogeneous Northern workers) and 
the nature of the imitation process (exogenous v.s. endogenous imitation risk) matter. Our finding that 
stronger Southern IPR protection will raise the imitation rate while reducing the innovation rate and 
the extent of FDI also provides one possible explanation why this policy may not generate the desired 
effects as expected by the North and the South. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a model where 
innovation targets all products and then examines the effects of the strengthening of IPR protection 
under a balanced-growth-path (BGP) equilibrium. Section 3 develops and studies a model where 
innovation targets only imitated goods. The final section concludes.  
2.  THE MODEL 
We develop a North-South quality-ladder model with skills accumulation based on Dinopoulos and 
Segerstrom (1999) and Parello (2008). There exist a developed Northern country (N) and a 
developing Southern country (S). Each economy (݅ ൌ ሼܰ, ܵሽ) is comprised of ܮ௜ሺݐሻ households at 
time t. In both countries, each individual has a lifespan of T periods. Given the birth rate, ߠ, and the 
death rate, δ, in both countries, the population dynamics imply that ߠܮ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ߜܮ௜ሺݐ ൅ ܶሻ. The 
growth rate of the population, ݃ , is equal to ሺߠ െ ߜሻ , and this indicates that ܮ௜ሺݐ ൅ ܶሻ ൌ
ܮ௜ሺݐሻ݁௚்.7  
2.1. Consumers  
The lifetime utility of the representative household in country ݅ is:      
																													 ௜ܷሺ0ሻ ൌ න ܮ௜ሺ0ሻ݁ିሺఘି௚ሻ௧ ݈݋݃ ݑ௜ሺݐሻ ݀ݐ, ܮ௜ሺ0ሻ ൐ 0, ߩ ൐ ݃,
∞
଴
																								ሺ1ሻ 
where ߩ denotes the subjective discount factor, and ݈݋݃ ݑ௜ሺݐሻ is the instantaneous utility faced by 
a representative household. 
Consumers living in either countries care about both the quantity and quality of goods and can 
choose from a continuum of products ݖ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ available at different quality levels (݆). Each quality 
                                                 
7  Note that the population dynamics indicate that ߠ ൌ ݃݁௚்/ሺ݁௚் െ 1ሻ and ߜ ൌ ݃/ሺ݁௚் െ 1ሻ. 
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level ‘݆’ is better than quality level ‘݆ െ 1’ by ߣ times, where the size of the quality increment ߣ is 
assumed to be constant and greater than 1. All products begin at time ݐ ൌ 0 with a quality level 
݆ ൌ 0 and a base quality ߣ଴ ൌ 1. This indicates that each product of quality level ݆ provides 
quality ߣ௝. The instantaneous utility faced by a representative household in country ݅ is: 
																																																						݈݋݃ ݑ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ න ݈݋݃	቎෍ߣ௝ݍ௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ
௝
቏
ଵ
଴
݀ݖ,																																														ሺ2ሻ 
where ݍ௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ is the household consumption in country ݅ for quality level ݆ of product z at time 
ݐ.  
Let ௜ܹሺݐሻ, ܣ௜ሺݐሻ, and ܧ௜ሺݐሻ respectively represent the sum of the discount wage income of 
the household from country ݅, the value of assets that the household holds at time ݐ, and the total 
expenditure. The aggregate intertemporal budget constraint is:  
																																		 ௜ܹሺݐሻ ൅ ܣ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ න ܮ௜ሺ0ሻሾܧ௜ሺݐሻ ൅ ݃ீሿ݁௚ఛ݁ିሾோሺఛሻିோሺ௧ሻሿ݀߬
∞
௧
,																												ሺ3ሻ 
where ݃ீ ൒ 0 is a lump-sum tax in every period. The cumulative interest rate, up to time t, is given 
by ܴሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ݎሺ߬ሻ݀߬௧଴ , where ݎሺ߬ሻ is the instantaneous interest rate at time ߬. The total expenditure 
for all products with different quality levels under price ݌௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ is: 
																																																								ܧ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ න ቎෍݌௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻݍ௜௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ
௝
቏ ݀ݖ.
ଵ
଴
																																													ሺ4ሻ 
The optimization problem can be solved by three steps. First, the expenditure for each product 
across available quality levels at each instant is allocated in a such way that consumers choose the 
quality that gives the lowest adjusted price, 
௣ೕሺ೥,೟ሻ
ఒೕ . This implies that consumers are willing to pay ߣ 
for a single quality level improvement in a product.  
Second, consumers allocate expenditures across products at each instant. Note that expenditure 
across all products will be the same since the elasticity of substitution between any two products is 
constant at unity. This leads to a global demand function for product ݖ of quality ݆ at time ݐ 
equal to ݍ௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ ൌ ܧሺݐሻ/݌௝ሺݖ, ݐሻ , where ܧሺݐሻ ൌ ܧேሺݐሻܮேሺݐሻ ൅ ܧௌሺݐሻܮௌሺݐሻ  represents global 
expenditure.  
Finally, consumers allocate lifetime wealth across time by maximizing lifetime utility subject to 
the intertemporal budget constraint. This gives the optimal expenditure path for the representative 
agent in each country: 
																																																																			ܧሶ௜ሺݐሻܧ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ݎሺݐሻ െ ߩ	.																																																																						ሺ5ሻ 
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In the following analysis, we focus on the balanced-growth-path (BGP) equilibrium where ݎሺݐሻ ൌ ߩ 
holds. 
2.2. Accumulation of skills 
All Southerners are unskilled workers and spend all of their time at work to earn the wage rate ݓௌ, 
which is normalized to 1. Agents in the North can choose to remain unskilled and earn the wage rate 
ݓே௅ , or choose to spend the time period (ܦே ) in school for skill training (human capital 
accumulation). After completing the education, skilled Northerners will receive the skilled wage 
rate		ݓேு per unit of effective labor. 
The accumulation of skills depends on public spending in education and time spent in schools. 
Public educational spending is financed by tax revenue and the government runs a balanced budget. 
We assume that each Northerner needs to pay a lump-sum tax of ݃ீ ൐ 0 in every period.8 This 
implies that the total Northern public educational spending in period ݐ is ܩே ൌ ݃ீܮே. We use ߶ே 
to denote the proportion of the unskilled population in the North, and it is endogenously determined. 
The remaining ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻܮேሺݐሻ individuals either attend schools for skill training or work as skilled 
workers. All skilled Northerners can benefit from public educational spending.9 The subsidy 
received by each Northern skilled worker is ݃ே ൌ ீಿሺଵିథಿሻ௅ಿ.
10 
Each Northerner chooses to receive education if the income of being a skilled worker is greater 
or equal to the income of being an unskilled worker; that is: 
																												න ݁ିሾோሺఛሻିோሺ௧ሻሿ
௧ା்
௧
ݓே௅݀߬ ൑ න ݁		ିሾோሺఛሻିோሺ௧ሻሿݓேு݄ேሺܦேሻ݃ேఊ݀߬
௧ା்
௧ା஽ಿ
,																				ሺ6ሻ 
where ߛ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ  denotes the elasticity of accumulation of skills with respect to the public 
educational investment. The function ݄ேሺܦேሻ with ݄ேᇱ ሺܦேሻ ൐ 0 and ݄ேᇱᇱሺܦேሻ ൏ 0 represents the 
skill production function of the amount of time spent in schools. Therefore, ݄ேሺܦேሻ݃ேఊ represents 
one efficiency unit of skilled labor.11  
In the equilibrium with the co-existence of skilled and unskilled workers in the North, equation (6) 
holds with equality. The optimal time spent in schools ሺܦഥேሻ is determined by the following equation: 
                        ρ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ ൌ ൫1 െ ݁ିఘሺ்ି஽ഥಿሻ൯݄ேᇱ ሺܦഥேሻ.                  (7) 
Substituting the solution of ܦഥே in (7) into (6), wage inequality (measured by the wage of skilled 
workers divided by the wage of unskilled workers) in the North can be expressed as: 
                                                 
8  Note that ݃ீ ൌ 0 in the South since Southerners do no accumulate skills. 
9  Public educational spending provides on-the-job training for those Northern workers who have completed 
education in order to prevent their human capital from depreciation. 
10 Note that ݃ே ൌ ܩே/ሾሺ1 െ ߶ேሻܮேሿ ൌ ݃ீ/ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻ. 
11 See Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) and Chen (2005, 2006) for the literature 
of accumulation of human capital. 
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																																																												ݓே
ு
ݓே௅ ൌ ݓே ൌ
ߪேሺܦഥேሻሺ1 െ ߶ேሻఊ
݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ 	,																																													ሺ8ሻ 
where ߪேሺܦഥேሻ ൌ ଵି௘
షഐ೅
௘షഐವഥಿି௘షഐ೅ ൐ 1. In this paper, we assume that ݓே ൐ 1. 
The supply of Northern unskilled labor (ܮே௅ ) is: 
																																																			ܮே௅ ൌ ߶ேܮே	.																																																																 
In the subpopulation of Northerners who choose to become skilled, the working agents are those 
born between period ሺݐ െ ܶሻ and ሺݐ െ ܦഥேሻ: 
න ߠ
௧ି஽ഥಿ
௧ି்
ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻܮேሺ߬ሻ݀߬ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻܤேሺܦഥேሻܮேሺݐሻ, 
where ܤேሺܦഥேሻ ൌ ൫݁௚ሺ்ି஽ഥಿሻ െ 1൯/ሺ݁௚் െ 1ሻ ൏ 1. The supply of effective Northern skilled labor 
(ܮேு ) is then:	
                   ܮேு ൌ ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ேఊܮே ൌ ߰ேሺ߶ேሻܮே	,			          (9) 
	where ߰ேሺ߶ேሻ ൌ ܤேሺܦഥேሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊሺ1 െ ߶ேሻଵିఊ. 
2.3. Producers 
Innovation occurs only in the North and all existing products are the targets of innovation. We 
assume that R&D difficulty (ߕሺݐሻ) is positively correlated with the size of the Northern population; 
that is, ߕሺݐሻ ൌ ߢܮே	with	ߢ ൐ 0.12 This assumption takes into account the concept that introducing 
new products to replace old ones is more difficult in a larger market. 
Northern firms engaging in R&D activity hire skilled Northern workers and produce 
cutting-edge quality products through innovation. A Northern firm in industry ݖ  engaged in 
innovation intensity ߡோሺݖ, ݐሻ will achieve one level of quality improvement in the final product with 
a probability ߡோሺݖ, ݐሻ݀ݐ for a time interval ݀ݐ. In order to achieve this, ܽோߡோሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ units of 
labor will be required at a total cost of 	ݓேுܽோߡோሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ.  
After succeeding in innovating a higher-level quality product, a Northern firm can undertake its 
production in the North by hiring unskilled Northern workers or carry out its production in the South, 
lowering its costs through FDI by hiring Southern workers to carry out this production.13 Let ݒே 
denote the expected discounted value of a Northern firm that has discovered a new product. To 
generate a finite rate of innovation, expected gains from innovation cannot exceed the costs, with 
equality being achieved when innovation occurs with positive intensity; that is: 
                      ݒே ൑ 	ݓேுܽோߕ, 	ߡோ ൐ 0	⟺	ݒே ൌ 	ݓேுܽோߕ	.                (10) 
Northern firms can optimally choose the intensity of FDI. To simplify the model, we assume 
                                                 
12  This is referred to as the permanent effects on growth approach in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999). 
13  Equation (32) indicates that ݓே௅ ൐ ݓௌ ൌ 1.  
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that FDI is costless. 14  Let ݒி  and ߡி  respectively represent capital gains from undertaking 
production in the South through FDI and FDI intensity. All Northern firms will choose to shift their 
productions to the South through FDI if ݒி ൐ ݒே, while FDI intensity will be zero if ݒி ൏ ݒே. 
Therefore, a Northern firm will feel indifferent between producing in the North or in the South, and 
FDI will occur with positive intensity: 
  ݒி ൌ ݒே.                               (11) 
Although Northern firms undertaking production in the South through FDI can save costs of 
production, they face the risk of imitation, which is denoted by ߡௌ. A Southern firm engaged in 
imitation intensity ߡௌሺݖ, ݐሻ for a time interval ݀ݐ requires ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡௌሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ units of labor. 
With the cost of ݓௌܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡௌሺݖ, ݐሻߕሺݐሻ݀ݐ, the Southern firm can successfully imitate the final 
product with a probability of ߡௌሺݖ, ݐሻ݀ݐ. Strengthening IPR protection in the South increases the cost 
of imitation and causes an exogenous increase in ߤ. Let ݒௌ be the expected gains of imitation, and 
then we have: 
                  ݒௌ ൑ ݓௌܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߕ, 	ߡௌ ൐ 0	⟺	ݒௌ ൌ ݓௌܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߕ	.           (12) 
We assume that that one unit of labor will be needed to produce one unit of the final product, 
regardless of the location of production. Old technologies that designs have been improved are 
available internationally; therefore, Southern firms are able to produce final goods by using old 
technologies. Following Howitt (1999), we assume that once a Northern firm has exited the market, 
it will not reenter the market because maintaining unused production and R&D facilities is costly.15 
Then Northern firms which produce through the use of state-of-the-art technologies will charge the 
price equal to the size of the improvement in quality times the marginal cost of closest rivals since 
they possess a one quality level lead over the closest rivals; that is, ݌ ൌ ߣ (and make a sale 
ݍ ൌ ܧ/ߣ). When successful at adapting its technology for Southern production, multinationals can 
earn a higher profit through by charging the price ݌ ൌ ߣ and hiring Southerners for production. 
Multinationals face higher production costs relative to Southern firms and the unit labor requirement 
for multinational equals ߦ which is greater than one.16 
When successful at imitating the technology of multinationals, a Southern firm is able to 
capture the entire industry market by setting a price that is slightly lower than ߦ. As maintaining 
unused production and R&D facilities are costly, the Northern rival which has exited the market will 
                                                 
14  Glass and Wu (2007) also adopt the same simplified setting of FDI. 
15  Previous studies tend to assume that either it is free to reenter the market for both Northern and Southern 
firms (Glass and Saggi, 2002) or it is costly to reenter the market for both Northern and Southern firms 
(Parello, 2008). Since comparing with Southern firms (imitators), it is more costly for Northern firms 
(innovators) to maintain unused production and R&D facilities once they have exited the market, we then 
follow Howitt (1999) and assume that it is costly for innovators to reenter the market.  
16  The same setting of production cost for multinationals is also adopted by Glass and Saggi (2002) and 
Parello (2008). 
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not reenter, then the Southern firm will raise its price to ߣ. This price is the Nash equilibrium price 
since the Southern firm has no incentive to deviate from it and the presence of positive costs for 
unused production and R&D facilities ensures that the former Northern rival will not reenter the 
market. In equilibrium, only the highest quality level available will sell. 
Since the cost of firms completing one unit of final production in the North is ݓே௅ , the 
instantaneous profits for Northern production are:  
																																																															ߨே ൌ ܧߣ ሺߣ െ ݓே
௅ሻ.																																																											ሺ13ሻ 
The instantaneous profits for FDI are therefore:  
																																																																	ߨி ൌ ܧߣ ሺߣ െ ߦሻ.																																																													ሺ14ሻ	 
Since the marginal cost for a Southern firms is the Southern wage rate, the instantaneous profits 
for a Southern firm which is successful at imitating the technology of multinationals are the same as 
multinationals: 
																																																																											ߨௌ ൌ ܧߣ ሺߣ െ 1ሻ.																																																											ሺ15ሻ 
The no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒே is: 
																																																											ݎሺݐሻ ൌ ݒሶேሺݐሻ ൅ ߨேሺݐሻ െ ߡோݒேሺݐሻݒேሺݐሻ .																																									ሺ16ሻ 
Equation (16) equates the real interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset for Northern 
production. The asset return includes (i) any potential capital gain ݒሶேሺݐሻ; (ii) profits of successful 
R&D; and (iii) the expected capital loss െߡோݒேሺݐሻ from creative destruction. 
The no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒி is: 
																																																							ݎሺݐሻ ൌ ݒሶிሺݐሻ ൅ ߨிሺݐሻ െ ሺߡோ൅ߡௌሻݒிሺݐሻݒிሺݐሻ .																																					ሺ17ሻ 
Equation (17) equates the real interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset for FDI. The asset 
return is the sum of (i) any potential capital gain ݒሶிሺݐሻ; (ii) profits of a successful imitation; (iii) the 
expected capital loss െߡோݒிሺݐሻ  from creative destruction; and (iv) the expected capital loss 
െߡௌݒிሺݐሻ from imitation. 
The no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒௌ is: 
																																																													ݎሺݐሻ ൌ ݒሶௌሺݐሻ ൅ ߨௌሺݐሻ െ ߡோݒௌሺݐሻݒௌሺݐሻ .																																										ሺ18ሻ 
Equation (18) equates the real interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset for Southern 
production. The asset return is the sum of (i) any potential capital gain ݒሶௌሺݐሻ; (i) profits of a 
successful imitation; and (iii) the expected capital loss െߡோݒௌሺݐሻ from creative destruction. 
2.4. Factor markets and the BGP equilibrium 
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We focus our analysis on the BGP equilibrium. Equations (10)-(12) together imply that along the 
BGP equilibrium:  
																																															ݒሶேሺݐሻݒேሺݐሻ ൌ
ݒሶிሺݐሻ
ݒிሺݐሻ ൌ 	
ݒሶௌሺݐሻ
ݒௌሺݐሻ ൌ 	
ሶܺ ሺݐሻ
ߕሺݐሻ ൌ
ܮሶேሺݐሻ
ܮேሺݐሻ ൌ ݃.																														ሺ19ሻ 
Substituting (19) into (16)-(18) and using the condition that ݎሺݐሻ ൌ ߩ, we can derive ݒே, ݒி and 
ݒௌ as: 
																																																																				ݒே ൌ ߨேߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ,																																																															ሺ20ሻ 
																																																																		ݒி ൌ ߨிߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅ ߡௌ ,																																																									ሺ21ሻ 
																																																																						ݒௌ ൌ ߨௌߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ .																																																														 ሺ22ሻ 
Let ݊ே, ݊ி, and ݊ௌ respectively denote the proportion of products produced completely in 
the North (the extent of Northern production), the proportion of the goods for which production is 
carried out through FDI (the extent of FDI) and the proportion of products produced completely in 
the South (the extent of Southern production). The sum of these product measures should be one: 
                               ݊ே ൅ ݊ி ൅ ݊ௌ ൌ 1.                          (23) 
Along the BGP equilibrium, the flows into FDI activities and Southern production equal the flows 
out of them: 
                               ߡி݊ே ൌ ሺߡோ ൅ ߡௌሻ݊ி,                         (24) 
                                  ߡௌ݊ி ൌ ߡோ݊ௌ.                            (25)	
Skilled Northern labor is used for the R&D sector, while unskilled Northern labor is used for 
the production sector. The labor-market clearing conditions for skilled and unskilled labor in the 
North are respectively: 
																																																																			ܽோߡோܺ ൌ ߰ேሺ߶ேሻܮே,																																																									ሺ26ሻ 
																																																																										݊ே ܧߣ ൌ ߶ேܮே.																																																															ሺ27ሻ 
The labor-market clearing condition for the South indicates that: 
																																																											ሺ݊ி ൅ ݊ௌሻ ܧߣ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡௌ݊ிܺ ൌ ܮௌ.																																				ሺ28ሻ 
We define two stationary variables as the adjusted level of R&D difficulty, ݔ ൌ ܺ ܮே ൌ ߢ⁄ , 
and the adjusted global expenditure, ܧ෠ ൌ ܧ ܮே⁄ . Substituting (10)-(15) into (20)-(22), we obtain: 
																																																					ܧ෠ ቆ1 െ ݓே
௅
ߣ ቇ ൌ ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻݓே
ுܽோߢ,																																											ሺ29ሻ	
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																																																			ܧ෠ ൬1 െ ߦߣ൰ ൌ ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅ ߡௌሻݓே
ுܽோߢ.																																									ሺ30ሻ	
																																																ܧ෠ ൬1 െ 1ߣ൰ ൌ ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻݓௌܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢ.																																								ሺ31ሻ	
Note that ݓௌ equals one. Then the economy is described by (7), (8) and (23)-(31) with eleven 
variables ൛	ݓேு,ݓே௅ , ܦഥே, ߶ே, ܧ෠, ݊ே, ݊ி	, ݊ௌ, ߡோ, ߡௌ, ߡிൟ. Using (29) and (30), we derive the wage rates as: 
																																																														ݓே௅ ൌ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ ൅ ߣߡௌߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅ ߡௌ ,																																																			ሺ32ሻ 
																																																														ݓேு ൌ ܧ
෠ሺߣ െ ߦሻ
ߣܽோߢሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅ ߡௌሻ.																																													ሺ33ሻ 
From (31), we can express ܧ෠ as a function of ߡோ:   
																																																									ܧ෠ሺߡோሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ
ߣ െ 1 .																																									ሺ34ሻ 
Combining (32) and (33) and using (34) to substitute ܧ෠ in (33), we derive ߡௌ as: 
																																																							ߡௌ ൌ ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோߣ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோݓே െ ߦ቉.																																	ሺ35ሻ 
Substituting ݓே in (35) by using (8), we now express ߡௌ as a function of ߶ே and ߡோ:   
																																ߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோߣ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሺ1 െ ߶ேሻఊ െ ߦ቉.																			ሺ36ሻ 
Using (34) to substitute ܧ෠ in (27), we derive ݊ே ൌ ݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ఒథಿா෠ሺఐೃሻ. Combining (23), (25), 
and (36), we obtain ݊ி ൌ ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ఐೃሾଵି௡ಿሺథಿ,ఐೃሻሿఐೄሺథಿ,ఐೃሻା	ఐೃ  and ݊ௌ ൌ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ 1 െ ݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ െ
݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ. From (24), we derive ߡி ൌ ߡிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ሺఐೃାఐೄሻ௡ಷሺథಿ,ఐೃሻ௡ಿሺథಿ,ఐೃሻ . Finally, using (26) and (28), 
the equilibrium can be reduced to the following two equations in ߶ே and ߡோ: 
																																																																												ߡோ ൌ ߰ேሺ߶ேሻܽோߢ ,																																																													ሺ37ሻ 
																			ሾ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻሿ ܧ
෠ሺߡோሻ
ߣ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻߢ ൌ
ܮௌ
ܮே .							ሺ38ሻ 
Because ௗటಿௗథಿ ൏ 0, equation (37) implies a negative relationship between ߶ே  and ߡோ . In 
Appendix A, we show that if ܽௌ is sufficiently small, then (38) will imply a positive relationship 
between ߶ே and ߡோ. Equations (37) and (38) are respectively represented by the NN locus and SS 
locus in Figure 1, and these are two equations that implicitly solve for the equilibrium values of 
{߶ே, ߡோ}. Once one derives the solution of {߶ே, ߡோ}, the remaining endogenous variables can be 
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solved accordingly.17 
<Figure 1 is inserted about here> 
2.5. Effects of IPR protection 
We are now ready to examine the effects of stronger Southern IPR protection. To facilitate our 
analysis, we assume that ܽௌ is sufficiently small in this section. Strengthening IPR protection 
lowers imitation risk, thereby motivating Northern firms to shift their production to the South. 
Equation (21) indicates that a lower ߡௌ ceteris paribus raises ݒி, increasing the motivation of FDI, 
reducing the demand for Northern unskilled labor and causing an increase in Northern wage 
inequality. However, stronger IPR protection raises the requirement of Southern labor for imitation 
activity. Together with an increase in the motivation of FDI, the demand for Southern labor will 
increase and this will restore rewards of Northern production and motivate firms to carry out 
production in the North. The increase in the extent of Northern production will raise the demand for 
Northern unskilled labor. We find that there will be an overall increase in the proportion of Northern 
unskilled labor, thereby reducing the innovation rate. Equation (8) indicates that a decrease in the 
proportion of Northern skilled labor will cause a reduction in Northern wage inequality. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, a higher ߤ shifts the SS locus downward while leaving the NN locus 
unaffected, leading to a lower innovation rate and a higher fraction of Northern unskilled workers. 
The following proposition summarizes these findings. 
Proposition 1. When Northern innovation targets all products, strengthening IPR protection in the 
South leads to (a) a reduction in Northern wage inequality; (b) an increase in the proportion of 
Northern unskilled workers; and (c) a decrease in the innovation rate.18 
Equation (35) indicates that the strengthening of IPR protection in the South will affect 
imitation intensity through three channels of ߡோ, ߤ and ݓே. First, the lower innovation rate caused 
by stronger IPR protection will reduce imitation intensity. Second, the higher imitation cost (an 
increase in ߤ) raises the expected gains of imitation under the no-arbitrage condition that determines 
ݒௌ as indicated by (31) and causes an increase in adjusted global expenditure (equation (34)), 
inducing an increase in imitation intensity. Third, the decrease in Northern wage inequality 
decreases the cost of Northern production, lowering the incentives of Southern firms to allocate 
Southern labor in the production sector and increasing the incentives to allocate Southern labor in 
the imitation sector. This will raise imitation intensity. In Appendix B, we show that if ܽோ is 
                                                 
17  See Appendix A for more details. 
18  Appendix B presents the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. 
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sufficiently large, then strengthening Southern IPR protection will result in an increase in imitation 
intensity. Equation (32) indicates that both the decrease in innovation intensity and the increase in 
imitation intensity will raise the wage rate of Northern unskilled workers. Because the wage rate of 
Southern (unskilled) workers is normalized to one, this means that the international wage dispersion 
of unskilled labor (which is measured by the ratio of the wage rate of unskilled Northerners to the 
wage rate of unskilled Southerners) will increase. Therefore, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. When Northern innovation targets all products, then strengthening IPR protection in 
the South will raise imitation intensity and the international wage dispersion of unskilled labor if ܽோ 
is sufficiently large. 
The no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒௌ (equation (31)) indicates that there are two 
opposite effects caused by the strengthening of IPR protection on adjusted global expenditure as 
demonstrated by (34). A higher ߤ caused by the strengthening of IPR protection raises adjusted 
global expenditure while a lower innovation intensity reduces it. Therefore, adjusted global 
expenditure may increase or decrease, depending on which effect dominates. From the 
market-clearing condition of unskilled labor in the North shown in (27), the extent of Northern 
production is determined by adjusted global expenditure and the fraction of Northern unskilled labor. 
Hence, the change of the extent of Northern production is ambiguous.  
Combining (23) and (25) yields :  
																																						݊ி ൌ ߡோሺ1 െ ݊ேሻߡௌ ൅	 ߡோ .																													 
With the ambiguous change in the extent of Northern production, we are not able to determine the 
change in the extent of FDI. However, if strengthening IPR protection in the South reduces adjusted 
global expenditure, then the extent of Northern production will increase and decrease the extent of 
FDI, leaving the change of the extent of Southern production undetermined.19 
3. INNOVATION TARGETS ONLY IMITATED PRODUCTS 
In Section 2 all products are the targets of Northern innovation. One may wonder if the results are 
sensitive to the setting of Northern innovation. Will the results remain robust if North innovation 
targets only those products imitated and produced by Southern firms? In order to answer this 
question, we modify some of the equations relating to innovation. Since innovation in the North 
does not target the products of other Northern firms, the expected capital loss from creative 
                                                 
19  See Appendix B for more details. 
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destruction does not affect the asset return of firms that carry out production in the North and the 
no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒே becomes: 
																																																																				ݎሺݐሻ ൌ ݒሶேሺݐሻ ൅ ߨேሺݐሻݒேሺݐሻ .																																																					ሺ39ሻ 
The expected capital loss from creative destruction does not affect the asset return of 
multinationals and the no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒி becomes: 
																																																												ݎሺݐሻ ൌ ݒሶிሺݐሻ ൅ ߨிሺݐሻ െ ߡௌݒிሺݐሻݒிሺݐሻ .																																										ሺ40ሻ 
Therefore, the reward for successful innovation by a Northern firm and the reward for multinationals 
become higher: 
																																																																									ݒே ൌ ߨேߩ െ ݃.																																																																			ሺ41ሻ 
																																																																						ݒி 	ൌ ߨிߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡௌ .																																																													ሺ42ሻ	
At the BGP equilibrium, FDI inflows equal FDI outflows, with this condition becoming: 
                                 ߡி݊ே ൌ ߡௌ݊ி,                             (43) 
Because only imitated products produced by Southern firms are the targets of Northern innovation, 
the labor-market clearing condition for the Northern skilled labor becomes: 
																																																																										ܽோߡோ݊ௌܺ ൌ ߰ேܮே,																																																							ሺ44ሻ 
It should be noted that all other equations remain unchanged.20 
3.1. The BGP equilibrium 
Substituting (10) and (13) into (41) as well as (11) and (14) into (42) yields: 
																																																														ܧ෠ ቆ1 െ ݓே
௅
ߣ ቇ ൌ ሺߩ െ ݃ሻݓே
ுܽோߢ,																																											ሺ45ሻ	
																																																										ܧ෠ ൬1 െ ߦߣ൰ ൌ ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡௌሻݓே
ுܽோߢ.																																											ሺ46ሻ	
The economy is described by (7), (8), (22), (23), (25), (27), (28), (43)-(46) with eleven variables 
൛	ݓேு, ݓே௅ , ܦഥே, ߶ே, ܧ෠, ݊ே, ݊ி	, ݊ௌ, ߡோ, ߡௌ, ߡிൟ. Since (31) remains the same, we get the same function of 
ܧ෠ሺߡோሻ as presented by (34). 
From (45) and (46), we can derive the wage rates of Northern unskilled and skilled labor as: 
																																																																	ݓே௅ ൌ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ ൅ ߣߡௌߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡௌ ,																																																									ሺ47ሻ 
                                                 
20  Equations (7), (8), (22), (23), (25), (27), (28) remain unchanged.  
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																																																														ݓேு ൌ ܧ
෠ሺߣ െ ߦሻ
ߣܽோߢሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡௌሻ.																																																						ሺ48ሻ 
Using (34) to substitute ܧ෠ in (48) and combining (47) and (48), we can derive ߡௌ as: 
																																												ߡௌ ൌ 1ߣ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோݓே െ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ቉.																							ሺ49ሻ 
Substituting (8) into (49), we now express ߡௌ as a function of ߶ே and ߡோ:   
																				ߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ 1ߣ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሺ1 െ ߶ேሻఊ െ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ቉.										ሺ50ሻ 
Combining (27) and (34), we derive ݊ே ൌ ݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ఒథಿா෠ሺఐೃሻ . From (44), we obtain 
݊ௌ ൌ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ టಿሺథಿሻ௔ೃ఑ఐೃ . Combining (25), (44), and (50), we derive ݊ி ൌ ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ
టಿሺథಿሻ
௔ೃ఑ఐೄሺథಿ,ఐೃሻ. From (43), we then calculate ߡி ൌ ߡிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ
ఐೄ௡ಷሺథಿ,ఐೃሻ
௡ಿሺథಿ,ఐೃሻ . Equation (23) then becomes:  
                      ݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ 1,            (51) 
Using (25), we now rewrite (28) as:  
																														ሾ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻሿ ܧ
෠ሺߡோሻ
ߣ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡோ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻߢ ൌ
ܮௌ
ܮே .												ሺ52ሻ 
The equilibrium can thus be reduced to the two equations of (51) and (52) in ߶ே and ߡோ. 
Appendix C shows that (52) exhibits a negative relationship between ߶ே and ߡோ. Furthermore, if ߤ 
is sufficiently large, then (51) will imply a negative relationship between ߶ே and ߡோ. Equations (51) 
and (52) are respectively represented by the NI locus and SI locus in Figure 2 and are two equations 
that implicitly solve for the equilibrium values of {߶ே, ߡோ}. The other endogenous variables are 
solved accordingly once we get the solution of {߶ே, ߡோ}. 
<Figure 2 is inserted about here> 
3.2. Effects of IPR protection 
We are now ready to examine the effects of strengthening IPR protection in the South when 
innovation targets only imitated products. In the following analysis in this section, we assume that ߤ 
is sufficiently large. As indicated in Figure 2, strengthening IPR protection will cause a downward 
shift in the NI locus and an upward shift in the SI locus, resulting in a lower rate of innovation and a 
higher proportion of unskilled workers in the North. 
Strengthening IPR protection lowers imitation risk, thereby motivating Northern firms to shift 
their production to the South. Equation (42) indicates that a decrease in ߡௌ ceteris paribus raises ݒி, 
strengthening the motivation of FDI, reducing the demand of Northern unskilled labor and 
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increasing the Northern wage inequality. However, the reduction in the imitation risk means that there 
are fewer products imitated by Southern firms. Since innovation targets only imitated goods, this 
implies that there will be a decrease in the demand for skilled labor in the North, causing Northern 
wage inequality to decrease. With more Northern firms shifting their production to the South and an 
increase in the requirement of Southern labor for imitation, the demand for Southern labor will 
increase. The restoration of the rewards of Northern production will raise the demand for Northern 
unskilled labor and reduce Northern wage inequality. Our results indicate that if ߤ is sufficiently 
large, there will be an overall increase in the proportion of unskilled workers in the North, along 
with corresponding decreases in Northern wage inequality. The innovation rate will decrease due to 
a lower proportion of Northern skilled labor available for the R&D sector.  
Proposition 3. When Northern innovation targets only products imitated by Southern firms, then 
strengthening Southern IPR protection will cause (a) a reduction in Northern wage inequality; (b) an 
increase in the proportion of Northern unskilled workers; and (c) a decrease in the innovation rate.21 
Equation (49) illustrates that stronger Southern IPR protection affects imitation intensity 
through three channels of ߡோ, ߤ and ݓே. First, the lower innovation intensity induced by stronger 
IPR protection will reduce imitation intensity. Second, the higher imitation cost (an increase in ߤ)  
raises the expected gain of Southern production under the no-arbitrage condition that determines ݒௌ, 
inducing an increase in imitation intensity. Third, the decrease in Northern wage inequality restores 
the reward of Northern production and more Southern labor is available for the imitation sector, 
causing imitation intensity to increase. Appendix D shows that if ߤ and ߛ are sufficiently large, 
then imitation intensity will increase with the strengthening of IPR protection.  
Because innovation targets only imitated goods, the profits of Northern production and FDI are 
not affected by innovation intensity. Combining (45) and (46) yields: 
																																																																				ߣ െ ݓே
௅
ߣ െ 1 ൌ
ߩ െ ݃
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡௌ .																																																							ሺ53ሻ 
Equation (53) indicates that there is a negative relationship between ݓே௅  and ߡௌ. Therefore, the 
wage rate of Northern unskilled workers will decrease with the increase in imitation intensity. 
Because innovation targets only imitated products and imitation only targets products produced 
through FDI (see (25) and (44)), the labor-market equilibrium condition for the Northern skilled 
labor can be rewritten as: 
							ܽோߢߡௌ݊ி ൌ ߰ே. 
This indicates that with the increase in ߡௌ and the decrease in ߰ே, the extent of FDI will increase. 
The following proposition summarizes these results.  
                                                 
21  Appendix D provides the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4. 
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Proposition 4. When Northern innovation targets only products imitated by Southern firms, then 
strengthening IPR protection in the South will raise imitation intensity and international wage 
dispersion of unskilled workers while reducing the extent of FDI if ߤ and ߛ are sufficiently large.  
As indicated by (34), the higher imitation cost due to stronger IPR protection will raise adjusted 
global expenditure while the lower innovation intensity will reduce it. Therefore, the change in 
adjusted global expenditure is ambiguous. From the market-clearing condition of unskilled labor in 
the North shown in (27), adjusted global expenditure will affect the extent of Northern production. 
Hence, the effect of stronger IPR protection on the extent of Northern production is also ambiguous. 
Furthermore, the change of the extent Southern production is also undetermined as indicated by (23). 
However, if stronger Southern IPR protection reduces adjusted global expenditure, then the extent of 
Northern production will increase while the change of the extent of Southern production is still 
undetermined.22 
Our findings indicate that the strengthening of IPR protection in the South will lead to 
decreases in both the rate of innovation and FDI activities, regardless of the targets for such 
innovation. The results on the changes in innovation intensity and FDI under the first scenario where 
innovation targets all products are quite different from those found by Glass and Wu (2007). There 
are two major differences between this paper and Glass and Wu (2007): the character of Northern 
labor and the nature of imitation process. Under the assumptions of homogeneous Northern workers 
and exogenous imitation risk, Glass and Wu (2007) show that if innovation targets all products, the 
strengthening of IPR protection in the South will cause a reduction in the labor wage rate in the 
North, thereby restoring the rewards of Northern production. The consequences of this will be an 
increase in the rate of innovation. Because the increase in employment in the innovation sector 
crowds out Northern labor used for production, the extent of Northern production will decrease, 
causing a corresponding increase in the extent of FDI. 
In this paper, the assumption of the heterogeneity among Northern labor allows firms to 
reallocate Northern labor between the innovation sector and production sector in response to the 
strengthening of Southern IPR protection. Moreover, we endogenize imitation intensity by assuming 
that imitation requires Southern labor. With a costly setting of imitation, stronger IPR protection will 
cause a reallocation of Southern labor between the production sector and imitation sector; as a result, 
the rate of imitation may increase or decrease. Our results reveal that regardless of the targets of 
innovation, stronger IPR protection will raise the demand for Southern labor and lower the wage 
inequality in the North. Comparing the results in these two scenarios, we find that in the second 
                                                 
22  See Appendix D for more details. 
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scenario where innovation targets only imitated goods, there will be one more force to reduce the 
demand for Northern skilled labor and Northern wage inequality since stronger IPR protection 
directly implies that there are fewer products imitated by Southern firms, causing fewer products 
targeted by innovation. The restoration of the rewards of Northern production will reduce the 
proportion of Northern skilled labor, resulting in decreases in innovation intensity and the extent of 
FDI and an increase in imitation intensity. Therefore, this paper highlights the significant roles of 
heterogeneity among Northern labor and the endogeneity of imitation intensity when analyzing the 
effects of IPR protection.  
4.  CONCLUSION  
In this paper we examine the effects of strengthening IPR protection in the South on innovation, 
imitation, Northern wage inequality, and the pattern of production based on a dynamic North-South 
general-equilibrium model with skill choice. Two scenarios of innovation settings are considered: 
innovation targets all products or innovation targets only imitated products. We find under both 
scenarios that strengthening IPR protection in the South will raise the fraction of Northern unskilled 
labor and reduce wage inequality in the North. Innovation intensity will decrease while imitation 
intensity will increase. When innovation targets all products, the effect of stronger IPR protection on 
the pattern of production is ambiguous. If global expenditure increases with the strengthening of IPR 
protection, then the extent of Northern production will increase while the extent of FDI will decrease. 
When innovation targets only imitated products, the extent of FDI will decrease with the 
strengthening of IPR protection. The extent of Northern production will increase if global 
expenditure increases. Our results reveal that stronger Southern IPR protection may not bring the 
desired effects on the innovation rate and the extent of FDI if imitation is costly. 
Our paper can be extended and applied by several ways to study different issues and we now 
point out two directions. First, in addition to products produced through FDI, Southern firms can 
also imitate products produced in the North. Second, Southerners are assumed to be homogeneous in 
order to simplify our analysis herein. By assuming that Southern workers, like their Northern 
counterparts, can have a choice of skills, our model can be extended to study the effects of 
strengthening IPR protection in the South, not only on Northern wage inequality and the skill choice 
of Northerners, but also on Southern wage inequality and the skill choice of Southerners. 
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Figure 1. The BGP equilibrium when innovation targets all products 
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Figure 2. The BGP equilibrium when innovation targets only imitated products 
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APPENDIX A 
The BGP equilibrium when innovation targets all products 
First note that ݔ ൌ ߢ, and ܦഥே and ݓே are respectively determined by (7) and (8). Using (29) 
and (30), we derive the wage rates as: 
																																																												ݓே௅ ൌ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ ൅ ߣߡௌߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅ ߡௌ ,																																																ሺA1ሻ 
																																																						ݓேு ൌ ܧ
෠ሺߣ െ ߦሻ
ߣܽோߢሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅ ߡௌሻ.																																											ሺA2ሻ 
From (31), we can express ܧ෠ as a function of ߡோ:   
																																																			ܧ෠ሺߡோሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ
ߣ െ 1 .																																					ሺA3ሻ 
Equation (A3) indicates that డா෠డఐೃ ൌ
ா෠
ఘି௚ାఐೃ ൐ 0 and 
డா෠
డఓ ൌ
ா෠
ଵାఓ ൐ 0. 
Substituting (8) into (35), we express ߡௌ as a function of ߶ே and ߡோ:   
																						ߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோߣ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሺ1 െ ߶ேሻఊ െ ߦ቉.																				ሺA4ሻ 
Equation (A4) indicates that డఐೄడథಿ ൌ
ఊ
ଵିథಿ ቀߡௌ ൅
కሺఘି௚ାఐೃሻ
ఒ ቁ ൐ 0 , 
డఐೄ
డఐೃ ൌ
ఐೄ
ఘି௚ାఐೃ ൐ 0  and 
డఐೄ
డఓ ൌ
ଵ
ଵାఓ ቀߡௌ ൅
కሺఘି௚ାఐೃሻ
ఒ ቁ ൐ 0. 
Combining (27) and (A3), we have:  
																																																									݊ே ൌ ߣ߶ேܧ෠ሺߡோሻ ൌ ݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ.																																															ሺA5ሻ 
Equations (A5) and (A3) indicate that డ௡ಿడథಿ ൌ
஛
ா෠ ൐ 0, 
డ௡ಿ
డఐೃ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ఘି௚ାఐೃ ൏ 0 and 
డ௡ಿ
డఓ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ଵାఓ ൏
0. 
Combining (23), (25) and (A4) yields:  
																																								݊ி ൌ ߡோሾ1 െ ݊ே
ሺ߶ே, ߡோሻሿ
ߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅	 ߡோ ൌ ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ.																																				ሺA6ሻ 
Equation (A6) indicates that డ௡ಷడథಿ ൌ
ି	ఐೃሺఐೄା	ఐೃሻ൬ങ೙ಿങഝಿ൰ିఐೃሺଵି௡ಿሻ൬
ങഈೄ
ങഝಿ൰
ሺఐೄା	ఐೃሻమ ൏ 0  and 
డ௡ಷ
డఐೃ ൌ
ି	ఐೃሺఐೄାఐೃሻ൬ങ೙ಿങഈೃ ൰ାఐೄሺଵି௡ಿሻ൬
ഐష೒
ഐష೒శഈೃ൰
ሺఐೄା	ఐೃሻమ ൐ 0 . From (23), (A5), and (A6), we have ݊ௌ ൌ 1 െ
݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ െ ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ.  
Equation (24), (A5) and (A6) indicate that:         
																																													ߡி ൌ ሺߡோ ൅ ߡௌሻ݊ி
ሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ
݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ߡிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ.																																						ሺA7ሻ 
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Equation (26) implies that: 
																																																																			ߡோ ൌ ߰ேሺ߶ேሻܽோߢ .																																																												ሺA8ሻ 
Equation (A8) indicates that ߡோ  and ߶ே  are negatively correlated since ߰ேᇱ ሺ߶ேሻ ൌ ௗటಿௗథಿ ൌ
െ ሺଵିఊሻటಿଵିథಿ ൏ 0.  
Using (23) and (A3)-(A6), we rewrite (28) as: 
														ሾ1 െ ݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻሿ ܧ
෠ሺߡோሻ
ߣ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ
ܮௌ
ܮே .																			ሺA9ሻ 
Using (27), we rewrite (A9) as: 
																										ܧ෠ሺߡோሻߣ െ ߶ே ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ
ܮௌ
ܮே .																										ሺA10ሻ 
Define ݃ሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ா෠ሺఐೃሻఒ െ ߶ே ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ. Taking the partial derivatives 
of ݃ሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ with respect to ߡோ yields: 
߲݃
߲ߡோ ൌ
1
ߣ ቆ
߲ܧ෠
߲ߡோቇ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢ ൤ߡௌ ൬
߲݊ி
߲ߡோ ൰ ൅ ݊ி ൬
߲ߡௌ
߲ߡோ൰൨ ൐ 0. 
Taking the partial derivatives of ݃ሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ with respect to ߶ே yields: 
																																	 ߲߲݃߶ே ൌ െ1 ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢ ൤ߡௌ ൬
߲݊ி
߲߶ே൰ ൅ ݊ி ൬
߲ߡௌ
߲߶ே൰൨. 
Using the fact that డ௡ಷడథಿ ൌ
ି	ఐೃሺఐೄା	ఐೃሻ൬ങ೙ಿങഝಿ൰ିఐೃሺଵି௡ಿሻ൬
ങഈೄ
ങഝಿ൰
ሺఐೄାఐೃሻమ , we can derive: 
߲݃
߲߶ே ൌ െ1 ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢ
ߡோ
ߡௌ ൅	 ߡோ ൤െߡௌ ൬
߲݊ே
߲߶ே൰ ൅ ݊ி ൬
߲ߡௌ
߲߶ே൰൨. 
Since డ௡ಿడథಿ ൐ 0, we have: 
߲݃
߲߶ே ൏ െ1 ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢ
ߡோ
ߡௌ ൅	 ߡோ ݊ி ൬
߲ߡௌ
߲߶ே൰. 
Moreover, the conditions that ఐೃఐೄା	ఐೃ ൏ 1 and ݊ி ൏ 1 imply that:  
߲݃
߲߶ே ൏ െ1 ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢ ൬
߲ߡௌ
߲߶ே൰. 
Since డఐೄడథಿ ൌ
ఊ
ଵିథಿ ቂߡௌ ൅
కሺఘି௚ାఐೃሻ
ఒ ቃ ൏
ఊ
ଵିథಿ ቀ1 ൅
కሺఘି௚ାଵሻ
ఒ ቁ, we have: 
																											 ߲߲݃߶ே ൏ െ1 ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢ
ߛ
1 െ ߶ே ൬1 ൅
ߦሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ 1ሻ
ߣ ൰.																							ሺA11ሻ 
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From (27), we get ݊ே ൌ ఒథಿா෠ ൏ 1. This indicates that ߶ே ൏
ா෠
ఒ. Therefore, using (A3), we 
can derive ଵଵିథಿ ൏
ఒ
ఒିா෠ ൌ
ఒିଵ
ఒିଵିሺఘି௚ାఐೃሻ௔ೄሺଵାఓሻ఑ ൏
ఒିଵ
ఒିଵିሺఘି௚ାଵሻ௔ೄሺଵାఓሻ఑. We can rewrite (A11) as: 
				 ߲߲݃߶ே ൏ െ1 ൅
ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢߛሾߣ ൅ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ 1ሻሿ
ߣ
ߣ െ 1
ߣ െ 1 െ ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ 1ሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢ. 
We then have డ௚డథಿ ൏ 0 if  
ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢߛሾߣ ൅ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ 1ሻሿ
ߣ
ߣ െ 1
ߣ െ 1 െ ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ 1ሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢ ൏ 1. 
That is, 
																				ܽௌ ൏ ߣሺߣ െ 1ሻሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢሼߛሺߣ െ 1ሻሾߣ ൅ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ 1ሻሿ ൅ ߣሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ 1ሻሽ.																	ሺP1ሻ 
Then (A10) will exhibit a positive relationship between ߡோ and ߶ே if ܽௌ is sufficiently small 
such that (P1) holds. Equations (A8) and (A10) are used to solve for ሼ߶ே, ߡோሽ. Once one derives 
the solution of ሼ߶ே, ߡோሽ, the remaining endogenous variables can be solved accordingly.  
  
APPENDIX B 
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 
Totally differentiating (A8) and (A10) with respect to ߶ே, ߡோ and ߤ yields: 
቎
߰ேᇱ ሺ߶ேሻ െܽோߢ
߲݃
߲߶ே
߲݃
߲ߡோ
቏ ൤݀߶ே݀ߡோ ൨ ൌ ൤
0
ܾଵ൨ ݀ߤ, 
where ܾଵ ൌ െ ଵఒ ቀ
డா෠
డఓቁ െ ܽௌߢ ቄߡௌ݊ி ൅
ሺଵାఓሻఐೃ
ሺఐೃାఐೄሻమ ቂሺ1 െ ݊ேሻߡோ ቀ
డఐೄ
డఓቁ െ ሺߡோ ൅ ߡௌሻߡௌ ቀ
డ௡ಿ
డఓ ቁቃቅ ൏ 0. 
Let ܤଵ ൌ ൥
߰ேᇱ ሺ߶ேሻ െܽோߢ
డ௚
డథಿ
డ௚
డఐೃ
൩ . Note that డ௚డఐೃ ൐ 0 . Furthermore, 
డ௚
డథಿ ൏ 0  if ܽௌ  is 
sufficiently small. Then t he determinant of ܤଵ is |ܤଵ| ൌ െ߰ேᇱ ሺ߶ேሻ ቀడ௚డఐೃቁ െ ܽோߢ ቀ
డ௚
డథಿቁ ൏ 0. 
Then the effects of the strengthening of IPR protection on ߶ே and ߡோ are: 
																																																		߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀߶ே݀ߤ ൌ
ܽோߢܾଵ
|ܤଵ| ൐ 0,																																																ሺB1ሻ 
																																																	ߡோᇱ 	ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ߡோ݀ߤ ൌ
߰ேᇱ ሺ߶ேሻܾଵ
|ܤଵ| ൏ 0.																																														ሺB2ሻ 
Equations (B1) and (B2) indicate that an increase of ߤ will raise ߶ே and reduce ߡோ. 
We are now ready to examine the effects of ߤ on other key variables. From (A4), we can 
calculate: 
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ߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ߡௌ݀ߤ  
ൌ ߡௌߡோ
ᇱ ሺߤሻ
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅
ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊሾ1 െ ߶ே ൅ ߛሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻሿ
ߣሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሺ1 െ ߶ேሻଵାఊ . 
Using (A3), we now rewrite ߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ as: 
																								ߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܧ
෠
ߣଶܽோߢݓே ቈ
ߛ߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻ
1 െ ߶ே ൅
ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅
1
1 ൅ ߤ቉ െ
ߦߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ߣ .																	ሺB3ሻ 
Using (B1) and (B2) to substitute ߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻ and ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ in (B3) yields: 
									ߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܧ
෠
ߣଶܽோߢݓே ቈ
ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻߛ߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ ൅
1
1 ൅ ߤ቉ െ
ߦߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ߣ  
														ൌ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܧ෠ߣଶܽோߢݓே ቈܾଵ
ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻߛܽோߢ െ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ߰ே
ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ|ܤଵ| ൅
1
1 ൅ ߤ቉ െ
ߦߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ߣ .												ሺB4ሻ 
Since ܾଵ ൏ 0 , |ܤଵ| ൏ 0  and ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ ൏ 0 , (B4) indicates that ߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൐ 0  if the following 
inequality holds: 
ሺ1 െ ߛሻ߰ே ൏ ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻߛܽோߢ.                (B5) 
Because ሺ1 െ ߛሻ߰ே ൏ ሺ1 െ ߛሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ  and ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻߛܽோߢ ൐ ሺߩ െ
݃ሻߛܽோߢ, then the inequality of (B5) will hold if: 
ሺ1 െ ߛሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ ൏ ሺߩ െ ݃ሻߛܽோߢ. 
That is, 
																																																			ܽோ ൐
ሺ1 െ ߛሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ
ሺߩ െ ݃ሻߛߢ .																																				ሺP2ሻ 
Therefore, ߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൐ 0 if the condition (P2) holds; that is, if ܽோ is sufficiently large.  
Equations (8) and (A1) indicate that: 
ݓேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ݓே݀ߤ ൌ െ
ߛݓே
1 െ ߶ே ߶ே
ᇱ ሺߤሻ ൏ 0, 
ݓே௅ ᇱሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ݓே
௅
݀ߤ ൌ െ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻሾሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ െ ߡௌߡோᇱ ሺߤሻሿ
ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅ ߡௌሻଶ ൐ 0.	 
Then an increase in ߤ will reduce Northern wage inequality and raise the wage rate for unskilled 
Northern workers. 
From (A3), we derive: 
																																																ܧ෠ᇱሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ܧ෠݀ߤ ൌ ܧ෠ ቈ
1
1 ൅ ߤ ൅
ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ቉.																																ሺB6ሻ 
Since ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ ൏ 0, equation (B6) implies that an increase in ߤ may increase or decrease ܧ෠ , 
depending on its effect on ߡோ. 
From (A5), (A6), and (25), we can derive: 
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																															݊ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀݊ே݀ߤ ൌ
ߣሾ߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻܧ෠ െ ߶ேܧ෠ᇱሺߤሻሿ
ܧ෠ଶ ,																								 
									݊ிᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀݊ி݀ߤ ൌ
െሺߡோ ൅ ߡௌሻߡோ	݊ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݊ேሻሾߡௌߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ െ ߡ௦ᇱ ሺߤሻߡோሿ
ሺߡோ ൅ ߡௌሻଶ ,											 
݊ௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ െሾ݊ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൅ ݊ிᇱ ሺߤሻሿ. 
The above two equations indicate that if ܧ෠ᇱሺߤሻ ൏ 0, then we have ݊ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൐ 0 and ݊ிᇱ ሺߤሻ ൏ 0, 
but the sign of ݊ௌᇱ ሺߤሻ is still undetermined. 
 
APPENDIX C 
The BGP equilibrium when innovation targets only imitated products 
First note that ݔ ൌ ߢ, and ܦഥே and ݓே are respectively determined by (7) and (8). Using (45) 
and (46), we derive the wage rates as: 
																																																																ݓே௅ ൌ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ ൅ ߣߡௌߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡௌ ,																																																						ሺC1ሻ 
																																																										ݓேு ൌ ܧ
෠ሺߣ െ ߦሻ
ߣܽோߢሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡௌሻ.																																																	ሺC2ሻ 
From (31), we can express ܧ෠ as a function of ݅ோ:   
																																																ܧ෠ሺߡோሻ ൌ ߣܽௌ
ሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ
ߣ െ 1 .																																									ሺC3ሻ 
Equation (C3) indicates that డா෠డఐೃ ൌ
ா෠
ఘି௚ାఐೃ ൐ 0 and 
డா෠
డఓ ൌ
ா෠
ଵାఓ ൐ 0.  
Substituting (8) into (49), we can express ߡௌ as a function of ߶ே and ߡோ:  
										ߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ 1ߣ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሺ1 െ ߶ேሻఊ െ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ቉.											ሺC4ሻ 
Equation (C4) indicates that డఐೄడథಿ ൌ
ఊ
ଵିథಿ ቀߡௌ ൅
కሺఘି௚ሻ
ఒ ቁ ൐ 0, 
డఐೄ
డఐೃ ൌ
ଵ
ఘି௚ାఐೃ ቀߡௌ ൅
కሺఘି௚ሻ
ఒ ቁ ൐ 0 and 
డఐೄ
డఓ ൌ
ଵ
ଵାఓ ቀߡௌ ൅
కሺఘି௚ሻ
ఒ ቁ ൐ 0. 
Substituting (C3) into (21) yields: 
																																																								݊ே ൌ ߣ߶ேܧ෠ሺߡோሻ ൌ ݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ.																																																	ሺC5ሻ 
Equations (C5) and (C3) indicate that డ௡ಿడథಿ ൌ
஛
ா෠ ൌ
௡ಿ
థಿ ൐ 0 , 
డ௡ಿ
డఐೃ ൌ െ
௡ಿ
ఘି௚ାఐೃ ൏ 0  and 
డ௡ಿ
డఓ ൌ
െ ௡ಿଵାఓ ൏ 0. 
From (44), we obtain: 
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																																																								݊ௌ ൌ ߰ேሺ߶ேሻܽோߢߡோ ൌ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ.																																														ሺC6ሻ 
Equation (C6) indicates that డ௡ೄడథಿ ൌ
௡ೄటᇲಿ ሺథಿሻ
టಿ ൏ 0, 
డ௡ೄ
డఐೃ ൌ െ
௡ೄ
ఐೃ ൏ 0.  
Combining (25), (44), and (C4) yields: 
																																																݊ி ൌ ߰ேሺ߶ேሻܽோߢߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ,																																											ሺC7ሻ 
where డ௡ಷడథಿ ൌ ݊ி ቂ
టᇲಿ ሺథಿሻ
టಿ െ
ଵ
ఐೄ ቀ
డఐೄ
డథಿቁቃ ൏ 0, 
డ௡ಷ
డఐೃ ൌ െ
௡ಷ
ఐೄ ቀ
డఐೄ
డఐೃቁ ൏ 0 and 
డ௡ಷ
డఓ ൌ െ
௡ಷ
ఐೄ ቀ
డఐೄ
డఓቁ ൏ 0.  
 Equation (43) indicates that:  
																																																							ߡி ൌ ߡௌ݊ி
ሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ
݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ߡிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ.																																										ሺC8ሻ 
Using (23) and (28), the equilibrium is reduced to the following two equations in ߶ே and ߡோ: 
		݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ 1,               (C9) 
ሾ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻሿ ܧ
෠ሺߡோሻ
ߣ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻߢ ൌ
ܮௌ
ܮே.	 
                                                                     (C10) 
We define ݄ሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൌ ݊ேሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ. Then we can calculate: 
߲݄
߲ߡோ ൌ
߲݊ே
߲ߡோ ൅
߲݊ி
߲ߡோ ൅
߲݊ௌ
߲ߡோ ൏ 0. 
߲݄
߲߶ே ൌ
݊ே
߶ே ൅ ݊ி ቈ
߰ேᇱ ሺ߶ேሻ
߰ே െ
1
ߡௌ ൬
߲ߡௌ
߲߶ே൰቉ ൅
݊ௌ߰ேᇱ ሺ߶ேሻ
߰ே  
ൌ ݊ே߶ே െ ݊ி
1
ߡௌ ൬
߲ߡௌ
߲߶ே൰ ൅
߰ேᇱ ሺ߶ேሻ
߰ே ሺ݊ி ൅ ݊ௌሻ 
																																														ൌ ݊ே߶ே െ ݊ி
1
ߡௌ
ߛ
1 െ ߶ே ൬ߡௌ ൅
ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ
ߣ ൰ ൅
1 െ ߛ
1 െ ߶ே ሺ1 െ ݊ேሻ 
																																													ൌ ݊ே߶ே െ ݊ி
ߛ
1 െ ߶ே ൬1 ൅
ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ
ߣߡௌ ൰ ൅
1 െ ߛ
1 െ ߶ே ሺ1 െ ݊ேሻ 
																																												ൌ ݊ேሺ1 െ ߛ߶ேሻ െ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ߶ே߶ேሺ1 െ ߶ேሻ െ ݊ி
ߛ
1 െ ߶ே ൬1 ൅
ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ
ߣߡௌ ൰ 
Equation (27) indicates that ௡ಿథಿ ൌ
஛
ா෠. Then we have: 
																	 ߲݄߲߶ே ൌ
1
1 െ ߶ே ൤ሺ1 െ ߛ߶ேሻ
λ
ܧ෠ െ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ െ ߛ݊ி ൬1 ൅
ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ
ߣߡௌ ൰൨.														ሺC11ሻ 
Since ሺ1 െ ߛ߶ேሻ ஛ா෠ ൏
஛
ா෠ , then (11) indicates that 
డ௛
డథಿ ൏ 0  if 
஛
ா෠ ൏ 1 െ ߛ . Note that 
஛
ா෠ ൌ
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ఒିଵ
௔ೄሺଵାఓሻ఑ሺఘି௚ାఐೃሻ ൏
ఒିଵ
௔ೄሺଵାఓሻ఑ሺఘି௚ሻ . Then 
డ௛
డథಿ ൏ 0  if ߤ  is sufficiently large such that the 
following condition holds: 
																																																										 ߣ െ 1ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߢሺߩ െ ݃ሻ ൏ 1 െ ߛ.																																										ሺP3ሻ 
If (P3) holds, we will obtain డ௛డథಿ ൏ 0. Then (C9) implies that there is a negative relationship 
between ߶ே and ߡோ since: 
݀ߡோ
݀߶ே ൌ െ
൬ ߲݄߲߶ே൰
ቀ߲݄߲ߡோቁ
൏ 0. 
Using (25), we can rewrite (C10) as: 
																				ሾ݊ிሺ߶ே, ߡோሻ ൅ ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻሿ ܧ
෠ሺߡோሻ
ߣ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡோ݊ௌሺ߶ே, ߡோሻߢ ൌ
ܮௌ
ܮே .								ሺC12ሻ	 
Taking the total derivatives of (C12) with respect to ߶ே and ߡோ, we obtain: 
݀ߡோ
݀߶ே ൌ
൬߲݊ி߲߶ே ൅
߲݊ௌ߲߶ே	൰
ܧ෠
ߣ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡோߢ ൬
߲݊ௌ߲߶ே	൰
ܧ෠ሺߩ െ ݃ሻ
ߣሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ ൬
ߦ݊ைߣߡௌ ൅
݊ௌߡோ ൰
൏ 0. 
Equation (C12) indicates that there is a negative relationship between ߶ே and ߡோ. Equations (C9) 
and (C12) are the two equations that implicitly solve for the equilibrium values of {߶ே, ߡோ}. After 
solving the solution of {߶ே, ߡோ}, we can solve other endogenous variables accordingly.  
 
APPENDIX D 
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4 
In the following analysis, we assume that condition (P3) holds. Totally differentiating (C9) and 
(C11) with respect to ߶ே, ߡோ and ߤ yields: 
൤ܾଶ ܾଷܾସ ܾହ൨ ൤
݀߶ே
݀ߡோ ൨ ൌ െ ൤
ܾ଺
ܾ଻൨ ݀ߤ, 
where ܾଶ ൌ డ௛డథಿ ൏ 0 , ܾଷ ൌ
డ௛
డఐೃ ൏ 0 , ܾସ ൌ ቀ
డ௡ಷ
డథಿ ൅
డ௡ೄ
డథಿ	ቁ
ா෠
ఒ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡோߢ ቀ
డ௡ೄ
డథಿ	ቁ ൏ 0 , 
ܾହ ൌ െ ா෠ሺఘି௚ሻఒሺఘି௚ାఐೃሻ ቀ
క௡ೀ
ఒఐೄ ൅
௡ೄ
ఐೃቁ ൏ 0 , ܾ଺ ൌ
డ௡ಿ
డఓ ൅
డ௡ಷ
డఓ ൏ 0  and ܾ଻ ൌ
௡ಷା௡ೄ
ఒ ቀ
డா෠
డఓቁ ൅
ா෠
ఒ ቀ
డ௡ಷ
డఓ ቁ ൅
ܽௌߡோ݊ௌߢ. 
Let ܤଶ ൌ ൤ܾଶ ܾଷܾସ ܾହ൨. With a few steps of calculation, we can derive the determinant of ܤଶ, 
|ܤଶ| ൌ ܾଶܾହ െ ܾଷܾସ, as follows: 
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|ܤଶ| ൌ ܾସ ൬߲݊ே߲ߡோ ൰ െ ܾହ ൬
߲݊ே
߲߶ே൰ ൅ ܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻߡோߢ ൬
߲݊ௌ
߲߶ே൰ ൬
߲݊ி
߲ߡோ ൅
߲݊ௌ
߲ߡோ 	൰
െ ݊ி ൅ ݊ௌߣ ቆ
߲ܧ෠
߲ߡோቇ ൬
߲݊ி
߲߶ே ൅
߲݊ௌ
߲߶ே	൰ ൐ 0. 
With a few steps of calculation, we derive: 
ܾ଻ ൌ ܧ
෠
ߣሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ ቈ݊ௌ െ
ߦ݊ிሺߩ െ ݃ሻ
ߣߡௌ ቉ ൅ ܽௌߡோ݊ௌߢ. 
From (25), we obtain that ݊ி ൌ ఐೃ௡ೄఐೄ . Then we can rewrite ܾ଻ as: 
																																								ܾ଻ ൌ ܧ
෠݊ௌ
ߣሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ ቈ1 െ
ߦߡோሺߩ െ ݃ሻ
ߣߡௌଶ ቉ ൅ ܽௌߡோ݊ௌߢ.																																	ሺD1ሻ 
Equation (D1) indicates that ܾ଻ ൐ 0 if: 
																																																									ߦߡோሺߩ െ ݃ሻߣߡௌଶ ൏
ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ
ߣߡௌଶ ൏ 1.																																												ሺD2ሻ 
From (C4), we have: 
ߡௌ ൌ 1ߣ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሺ1 െ ߶ேሻఊ െ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻ቉ 
																																	൐ ሺߩ െ ݃ሻߣ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻ െ ߦ቉ 
Then the inequality of (D2) will hold if: 
															ߡௌଶ ൐ ቊሺߩ െ ݃ሻߣ ቈ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻ െ ߦ቉ቋ
ଶ
൐ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻߣ .										 
Then ܾ଻ ൐ 0 if ߤ is sufficiently large such that the following condition holds: 
																																							ቈሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீ
ఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻ െ ߦ቉
ଶ
൐ ߦߣߩ െ ݃.																													ሺP4ሻ 
In the following analysis, we assume that ߤ is sufficiently large such that the condition (P4) 
holds. The effects of the strengthening of IPR protection on ߶ே and ߡோ are: 
																																													߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀߶ே݀ߤ ൌ
ܾହܾ଺ െ ܾଷܾ଻
|ܤଶ| ൐ 0,																																												ሺD3ሻ 
																																															ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ߡோ݀ߤ ൌ
ܾଶܾ଻ െ ܾସܾ଺
|ܤଶ| ൏ 0.																																														ሺD4ሻ 
Therefore, an increase of ߤ will raise ߶ே while reducing ߡோ. 
We are now ready to examine the effects of ߤ on other key variables. From (C4), we can 
calculate: 
																										ߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ߡௌ݀ߤ ൌ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܧ෠
ߣଶܽோߢݓே ቈ
ߛ߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻ
1 െ ߶ே ൅
ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൅
1
1 ൅ ߤ቉.																					ሺD5ሻ 
Using (D3) and (D4) to substitute ߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻ and ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ in (D5), we can get: 
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ߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܧ
෠
ߣଶܽோߢݓே ቈ
ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻߛ߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ ൅
1
1 ൅ ߤ቉ 
																																			ൌ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܧ෠ߣଶܽோߢݓே ൤
ܾ଺ߝଵ ൅ ܾ଻ߝଶ
ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ|ܤଶ| ൅
1
1 ൅ ߤ൨,																								ሺD6ሻ 
where ߝଵ ൌ െߛሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻܾଷ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻܾଶ and ߝଶ ൌ ߛሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻܾହ െ ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻܾସ. With a 
few steps of calculation, we can derive: 
																																					ߝଵ ൌ െሺ1 െ ߛሻ ൅ ߛ
ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ߰ே
ܽோߢߡோଶ ൅
ߣ
ܧ෠ 
																																										ൌ െሺ1 െ ߛሻ ൅ ߛሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீ
ఊሺ1 െ ߶ேሻଵିఊ
ܽோߢ . 
Thus, ߝଵ ൐ 0 if ߛ is sufficiently large such that the following condition holds: 
																																				ሺ1 െ ߶ேሻଵିఊ ൐
ሺ1 െ ߛሻܽோߢ
ߛሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ .																						ሺD7ሻ 
Since ߡௌ ൏ 1,we can use (C4) to derive: 
																															1 െ ߶ே ൐ ቊ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሾߣ ൅ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻሿ ቋ
ଵ
ఊ .													ሺD8ሻ 
Then condition (D7) will hold if  
ቊሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீ
ఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሾߣ ൅ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻሿ ቋ
ଵିఊ
ఊ ൐ ሺ1 െ ߛሻܽோߢߛሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ. 
Since ߡோ ൐ 0, then the above inequality will holds if: 
ቊሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻሺߩ െ ݃ሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீ
ఊ
ሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሾߣ ൅ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻሿ ቋ
ଵିఊ
ఊ ൐ ሺ1 െ ߛሻܽோߢߛሺߩ െ ݃ሻܤேሺܦഥேሻ݄ேሺܦഥேሻ݃ீఊ. 
This inequality can be re-written as: 
												ቊ ሺߣ െ ߦሻܽௌሺ1 ൅ ߤሻሺߣ െ 1ሻܽோߪேሺܦഥேሻሾߣ ൅ ߦሺߩ െ ݃ሻሿቋ
ଵିఊ
ఊ ൐ ሺ1 െ ߛሻܽோߢ
ߛ݃ீܤேሺܦഥேሻሾ݄ேሺܦഥேሻሺߩ െ ݃ሻሿ
ଵ
ఊ
.					ሺP5ሻ 
Then ߝଵ ൐ 0 if ߤ is sufficiently large such that condition (P5) holds. 
With a few steps of calculation, we can derive: 
ߝଶ ൌ ܧ
෠݊ௌ
ߣߡௌ ൤ߡோ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻߡௌ
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߣߡோ
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ െ ߛሺߩ െ ݃ሻ൨ 
൏ ܧ෠݊ௌߣߡௌ ൤ߡோ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߣߡோ
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ െ ߛሺߩ െ ݃ሻ൨ 
Thus, ߝଶ ൏ 0 if ߡோ is sufficiently large such that the following condition holds: 
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																																																ߡோ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߣߡோߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ ൏ ߛሺߩ െ ݃ሻ.																																				ሺP6ሻ 
Condition (P6) will hold if ߡோ is sufficiently small and ߛ is sufficiently large. Since ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ ൏ 0, 
then the condition (P6) will hold if ߤ and ߛ are sufficiently large. Because |ܤଶ| ൐ 0, ܾ଺ ൐ 0 
and ܾ଻ ൏ 0, then (D5) indicates that ߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൐ 0 if ߤ and ߛ are sufficiently large such that 
conditions (P5) and (P6) hold. 
Equations (A1) and (8) indicate that: 
ݓேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ݓே݀ߤ ൌ െ
ߛݓே
1 െ ߶ே ߶ே
ᇱ ሺߤሻ ൏ 0, 
ݓே௅ ᇱሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ݓே
௅
݀ߤ ൌ
ሺߣ െ ߦሻሺߩ െ ݃ሻߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ
ሺߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡௌሻଶ ൐ 0.		 
From (C7), we obtain: 
݊ிᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀݊ி݀ߤ ൌ
ߡௌ߰ேᇱ ሺߤሻ െ ߰ேߡௌᇱ ሺߤሻ
ܽோߢߡௌଶ ൏ 0. 
Then an increase in ߤ will raise ݓே௅  and reduce ݓே and ݊ி. 
From (C3), we derive: 
ܧ෠ᇱሺߤሻ ൌ ݀ܧ෠݀ߤ ൌ ܧ෠ ቈ
1
1 ൅ ߤ ൅
ߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ߩ െ ݃ ൅ ߡோ቉. 
Then an increase in ߤ may increase or decrease ܧ෠, depending on its effect on ߡோ. 
Equations (C5) and (C6) imply that: 
																																														݊ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀݊ே݀ߤ ൌ
ߣሾ߶ேᇱ ሺߤሻܧ෠ െ ߶ேܧ෠ᇱሺߤሻሿ
ܧ෠ଶ ,																															ሺD9ሻ 
						݊ௌᇱ ሺߤሻ ൌ ݀݊ௌ݀ߤ ൌ 	
ߡோ߰ேᇱ ሺߤሻ െ ߰ேߡோᇱ ሺߤሻ
ܽோߢߡோଶ . 
The above two equations indicates that the effects of an increase in ߤ on ݊ே  and ݊ௌ  are 
ambiguous. Equation (D9) indicates that if ܧ෠ᇱሺߤሻ ൏ 0, then we have ݊ேᇱ ሺߤሻ ൐ 0. But the sign of 
݊ௌᇱ ሺߤሻ is still undetermined. 
 
